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 Thailand is one of the emerging markets that realized the importance of improving the 
corporate governance of firms as suggested by the World Bank. The market regulators, including 
the Securities and Exchange Commission of Thailand, have admitted that good corporate 
governance could improve the credibility of firms, and attract more investment from both 
domestic and foreign investors. Apart from that, it sustains companies to survive in the capital 
market as well as increases the competitiveness and then benefits the economic growth.  It is 
well known that external auditors play a significant role in the corporate governance mechanism. 
Hence, this study investigates what factors affect the decision of public listed firms’ auditor 
choices. We conduct a logit regression to examine the relationship between the firms’ corporate 
governance mechanisms (such as the percentage of the largest shareholders, CEO duality, and 
corporate governance (CG) rating) and the external auditor choice decisions using the data of  
Thai listed firms on the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) during a period of 2010-2014.    
Similar to previous studies, we assume that external auditors from BIG 4 audit firms 
provide more effective audit works than those from Non-BIG 4 audit firms. Our empirical results 
can be summarized as follows. First, we find that firms with corporate governance (CG) rating 
equal or above than “Good” are more likely to hire BIG 4 auditors, which suggests that these 
companies have incentive to employ high-quality auditors to guarantee the credibility of 
financial reports in order to gain investors’ trust. Secondly, we find that firms with a separating 
CEO and the Chairman of the board, or with a more concentrated ownership, are more likely to 
hire BIG 4 auditors. The reason could be that most of Thai firms are family firms and they want 
to mitigate the principal-agency conflicts through high-quality external auditors. 
Taking into account of all factors, the empirical results may contribute to our 
understanding that the quality of Thai public listed firms’ corporate governance practices has an 
optimistic impact on their auditor choice decisions, and signal the effectiveness of audit 
monitoring. In other words, firms with a good practice of corporate governance tend to be 
audited by high-quality external auditors. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Background and Motivation 
 
The goal of this study is to examine the relationship between Thai listed firms’ corporate 
governance mechanisms and their auditor choice decisions. Studies on auditor choice have been 
conducted mostly in developed countries such as U.S. (Copley & Douthett, 2002; Hudaib & 
Cooke, 2005) and the UK (Chaney, Jeter, & Shivakumar, 2004) where the auditing environments 
are relatively similar (Lin & Liu, 2009). 
At present, there are some empirical studies that investigate auditor choice decisions in 
the emerging markets such as China (Lin & Liu, 2009; Liu, Yuen, & Chen, 2009; Leung & 
Cheng, 2014), Malaysia (Abdullah, Ismail, & Jamaruddin, 2008), Egypt (Soliman & Elsalam, 
2012), and Iran (Mahdavi, Maharlouie, Ebrahimi, & Sarikhani, 2011). However, there are 
occasional studies on this issue though the credibility of companies financial reporting and the 
operation of capital market are crucial affected by the auditor choice of firms in Thailand. It is 
therefore a great opportunity to study the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firms’ auditor choice decisions in Thai capital market. 
The meaning of corporate governance is defined as the practices, processes and system 
for firms to ensure that they operate efficiently, transparently and auditable. It also involves 
equalizing the rights and interests of firms’ stakeholders including their management, 
shareholders, investors, suppliers, account payables, customers, government and the community. 
Corporate governance mechanisms can divide into two groups, internal mechanisms and external 
mechanisms. For internal mechanisms, they include oversight of management, independent 
internal audits, structure of the board of directors into levels of responsibility, segregation of duty 
and policy development. For external mechanisms, there are regulators, governments, trade 
unions and financial institutions.  
Thai government has focused its effort on enhancing a high standard of listed firms’ 
corporate governance especially after the 1997 financial crisis in Asian countries. Thai economy 
also suffered from the significance fell down of Thai baht currency because of Thai 
government’s policy to float Thai baht against US dollar. Many companies faced with financial 
problems, suffered loss and needed to restructure due to they over borrowed foreign short loans, 
resulting in the failure of 56 financial institutions and many non-financial companies 
(Limpaphayom and Connelly, 2004). In addition, both domestic and foreign investors 
disappeared because of the uncertainty economic situations. More importantly, Thailand had a 















The main reasons for this crisis were declared by the World Bank (1998: 67-68) that “At 
firm level, there were weak corporate governance mechanisms in East Asian countries including 
Thailand which are ineffective of board of directors, weak internal control, unreliable financial 
reporting, lack of transparent disclosure, careless enforcement to ensure compliance, and poor 
audits.”  It is the World Bank responsibility to improve corporate governance of emerging 
markets. This caused Thai government, including market regulators such as the Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Thailand (SECT) to revise a practice of corporate governance, as a 
crucial element to regain prosperity, economic growth and investor confidence in capital market. 
SECT played a vital role by adopting the international principles of good corporate governance 
based on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). At present, 
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance are widely used as international benchmark of good 
practices in corporate governance by many countries all over the world including Thai listed 
firms under the control of the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET). 
The Thai Institute of Directors Association [IOD] (2010) informed that the scoring 
criteria following the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and SET are mainly divided 
into 5 categories (Rights of shareholders; The Equitable treatment of shareholders; Roles of 
stakeholders; Disclosure and transparency; and Board responsibilities). Each category has the list 
of criteria under the review and comment of a Steering Committee. Corporate governance (CG) 
assessment criteria have been continuously improved to be in line with the internationally-
accepted standards.  
Since 2001, IOD in co-operate with SET and the office of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission Thailand (SECT) are responsible for Thai listed firms’ corporate governance 
practices evaluation. The results are published in Corporate Governance Report of Thai Listed 
Companies (CGR report) by annually. The source information for assessment is company annual 
report, annual information filing (Form 56-1), notice and minutes of companies’ shareholders 
meeting, company website, information on SET/SEC database, and other publicly available 
information. There are six ranks of score and each rank gets a different level of recognition 
denoted by the number of the National Corporate Governance Committee logo. However, only 
firms receiving Excellent, Very Good, and Good results will be publicized (IOD, 2010). Table 1 
presents the corporate governance rating of Thai listed firms. 
As Disclosure and transparency is one of the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 
suggesting that Accounting and auditing standards and practitioners (external auditors) play an 
important role in the development of corporate governance by improving the quality of financial 
reporting, which in turn reduces the gap of information between managers, dominant 
shareholders and other shareholders (Boonyawat, 2013). The responsibility of external auditors 
is to audit and express the opinion to firms’ financial reports whether they are in line with 















financial reports with “clean auditor’s opinion” to SECT and the financial statements must be 
reviewed in quarterly basis by external auditors who conducted their works in accordance with 
Thai Accounting Standard (TASs) (Boonyawat, 2013). TASs is developed based on international 
standard but are adjusted for Thai business environment to be suitable. This enforcement of 
SECT can be expected the reliability and transparency of financial reporting and accounting 
information.  
Many previous studies use BIG 4 auditors
1
 and Non-Big 4 auditors to define external 
audit quality, assuming that the brand of the Big 4 audit firms is known as an indication of higher 
quality audit in market participants in comparison to the audit services provided by external 
auditors from non-Big 4 firms. 
Leung & Cheng (2014) said that most foreign scholars adopt BIG 4 auditors as the proxy 
for high-quality audit works so the firms’ auditor choice directly affects their corporate 
governance and operations. We use BIG 4 audit firms to proxy for high-quality auditors as well 
to be in line with most literature. 
 As we aim to investigate, whether the corporate governance mechanisms have influenced 
the decisions of listed firms’ auditor choice, it seeks to the contribution of literature on the 
agency theory, the corporate governance theory, the role of external auditors, the audit quality, 











1 BIG 4 audit firms are multinational accounting firms in the world referred to PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), Deloitte Touche 















      Table 1: Corporate governance rating of Thai listed firms 










     Number of logo 
 
           Description 
 
90-100                           
           
 
 
              Excellent 
 
80-89 
     
 
 Very Good 
 
70-79 

































1.2 Literature Review 
 
1.2.1 Agency Theory and audit quality 
The utility of external audit works can explain by using agency theory in previous 
auditing research (DeAngelo, 1981; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; Dye, 1993; Chaney et al., 2004).  
Agency theory assumes that there is a contractual relationship and therefore the two contracting 
parties, one party can describe as principal, director, supervisor, and then the other side an agent 
thus subordinate (Boučková, 2015). The agent (managers) supposed to work for the principal 
(owner). Kim & Nofsinger (2007) said that if shareholders cannot effectively monitor the 
managers’ behavior, then managers might be tempted to use the firm’s assets for their own ends, 
all at the expense of shareholders. This situation is known as the agency problem. To solve this 
problem, firms need to ensure that management will act in the best interest of the owner 
therefore contractual agreement must be set between owner (principal) and management (agent)  
which includes the external monitoring carried out by independent auditors (Lin & Liu, 2009). 
 Because external auditors are supposed to be independent from the firms being audited 
and because their explicit job is to check for financial misstatements and adherence to GAAP, it 
is they who must ensure the accuracy of the firm’s financial information for shareholders (Kim 
& Nofsinger, 2007), suggesting that the work quality of external auditors are very essential. 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board [PCAOB] (2013) defines audit quality as meeting 
investors’ needs for independent and reliable audits and robust audit committee communication 
on financial statements, including related disclosures, assurance about internal control and going 
concern warnings. Lee, Stokes, Taylor & Walter (2003) referred the audit quality to two 
components: “technical aspect – the ability to detect misstatements” and “independent aspect – 
willing to report the misstatements uncovered in an audit work”. Francis (2004) said that external 
auditors from BIG 4 audit firms, on average, are of higher audit-quality than Non-BIG 4 auditors 
because BIG 4 auditors can charge higher audit fee which implies higher audit quality through 
more audit efforts (more hours) or greater expertise of the auditors. Audit firms’ size can be a 
surrogate for audit quality (Watt and Zimmermand, 1981). DeAngelo (1981) explained that 
larger audit firms are more likely to produce high quality work in order to retain their reputation 
and their independence because normally they have many clients and have “more to lose”. 
However, there were some study argued that all auditors are controlled by the same professional 
standard so audit firms’ size alone should not make any difference to their quality of work 
(Lawrence et al., 2011 ). In Thailand, Thai laws restricted accounting professionals to Thai 
nationals so BIG 4 audit firms have merged with large and famous Thai audit firms (Boonyawat, 
2013). Moreover, there is research about earnings quality in Thailand suggesting that BIG 4 
auditors are higher audit quality than Non-BIG 4 auditors because they found that clients from 















(Herrmann et al., 2008). According to large size of BIG 4 audit firms and their reputation, this 
study hypothesizes that external auditors from BIG 4 audit firms are proxy of high auditing 
quality. 
 
1.2.2 Corporate governance, the monitoring role of audits and auditor’s choice 
Todorovic (2013) indicates that corporate governance is a key element for improvement 
of investors’ confidence, increase of competitiveness and improvement of economic growth. 
Good corporate governance can help to prevent corporate scandals, fraud, and potential civil and 
criminal liability of companies. It also enhances image and reputation of a company and makes it 
more attractive to investors, suppliers, customers and other stakeholders of the company and 
there is evidence from many researches that good corporate governance produces direct 
economic benefit to the company, making it more profitable and competitive. Ashbaugh and 
Warfield (2003) suggest that external auditors play a corporate governance role as an important 
monitoring device in financial reporting process so stakeholders expect the reliable financial 
information from their works. This also suggests that the independent audits are a significant 
component in corporate governance (Defond et al., 2000; Allen et al., 2005) so the association 
between the quality of governance mechanisms and the credibility of financial reporting is 
optimistic (Cohen et al., 2002; Farbar, 2005). Normally firms have to take a trade-off in their 
auditor choice decisions: to hire high-quality auditors to signal effective audit monitoring and 
good corporate governance to lower their capital raising costs, or to select low-quality auditors 
with less effective audit monitoring in order to reap private benefits derived from weak corporate 
governance and less-transparent disclosure (Lin & Liu, 2009).  
There were some studies about the effect of internal corporate mechanisms such as the 
ownership concentration, the duality of CEO and Chairman of board of directors (BoDs) on the 
feasibility of choosing BIG 4 auditors. 
Ownership Concentration: Many studies found that large shareholders may concern 
only with their own interests, they may put pressure on managers to act for their private benefit 
so they expropriate other shareholders and related parties (LaPorta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, 
& Vishny, 2002; Anderson et al., 2004). This characteristic of ownership can create serious 
agency problem, arising because of conflict of interests between two groups of principals 
(dominant and minority shareholders) (Boonyawat, 2013) so firms with this characteristic of 
large shareholders are less likely to choose BIG 4 auditors (Ashbaugh & Warfield, 2003; Lin & 
Liu, 2009). 
CEO duality:  For good corporate governance, it is believed that firms should separate 
the role of Chief Executives Officer (CEO) and the chairman of Board of Directors (BoDs) so 















choose BIG 4 auditors for the situation in which CEO and BoDs are the same person (Lin & Liu, 
2009; Soliman & Elsalam, 2012; Leung & Cheng, 2014). 
In this paper, we further examine the effect of other corporate governance mechanisms on 
the decision of Thai listed firms’ external auditor choices by adding more internal and external 
corporate governance mechanisms variables in the model. Those variables are the proportion of 
share difference between the first largest shareholders and the second largest shareholders, and 
firms’ corporate governance (CG) rating evaluated by Thai organization (IOD). We discuss 
about these in Chapter 2. 
 
1.3 Thesis Structure 
 
The structure of this paper is divided into the following chapters: 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
The chapter describes the background and motivation of the thesis, review of related literatures, 
and the thesis’s organization. 
Chapter 2 Hypotheses development 
The chapter develops the main and secondary hypotheses based on the each variable of corporate 
governance mechanisms of the regression model. 
Chapter 3 Methodology 
The chapter outlines the data and methodology of the empirical study. We first discuss the 
selection of financial data, corporate governance (CG) rating, and corporate governance 
mechanisms data for the empirical investigation. Then we explain the estimation method and 
criteria used for hypotheses test.  
Chapter 4 Empirical Evidence 
The chapter presents the results of the empirical study. We develop the logit regression model to 
examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the auditor choices of Thai listed 
firms. We consider the robustness check and endogeneity issue in this study as well. 
Chapter 5 Conclusion 


















Chapter 2: Hypotheses development 
  
This chapter develops the hypotheses based on each corporate governance mechanisms. 
The hypotheses are divided into two parts: the main hypothesis and the secondary hypotheses. 
 
Main hypothesis: 
Firms with corporate governance (CG) rating equal or above “Good” tend to choose external 
auditors from BIG 4 audit firms. 
The Thai Institute of Directors Association (IOD) in co-operation with SET and the 
office of the Securities and Exchange Commission Thailand (SECT) are responsible for 
corporate governance practices of Thai listed firms’ evaluation by giving the corporate (CG) 
rating publishing as score logo of the National Corporate Governance Committee in Corporate 
Governance Report of Thai Listed Companies (CGR report). However, only firms receiving 
Excellent, Very Good, and Good results will be publicized. This implies that CG rating 
(Excellent, Very Good, and Good) is the proxy of corporate governance external mechanisms as 
given by the external regulators. 
Cohen et al. (2002) found that firms’ corporate governance and operations are affected by 
the quality of external auditors and some studies documented that firms with good corporate 
governance mechanisms require a high audit quality so they are willing to pay higher fee 
(Carcello et al., 2002). Lin & Liu (2009) found that hiring high-quality auditors signals the 
effective audit monitoring and good corporate governance. Moreover, Abdullah, Ismail, & 
Jamaruddin (2008) documented that good corporate governance mechanisms are attempted to 
acquire high quality of audit services for the company. In other words, companies expect a high 
quality of external auditor works to improve their corporate governance practices. As a result, 
firms with corporate governance (CG) rating equal or above “Good” are more likely to choose 
auditors from BIG 4 audit firms, as it is the proxy of high quality of audit. 
 
Secondary hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. (H1): The higher the percentage of total shares held by the largest shareholders, 
the more likely external auditors of BIG 4 audit firms will be chosen. 
Leung & Cheung (2014) documented that there are two controversial issues about the 
impact of the concentrated ownership on the auditor choice. Some studies found that with high 
ownership concentrate, largest shareholders may concern only their own interests and try to 















(Anderson et al., 2004; LaPorta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002). This could be the 
reason for them to choose low-quality auditors with less effective audit monitoring in order to 
reap private benefits derived from weak corporate governance and less-transparent disclosure 
(the opaqueness gains) (Lin & Liu, 2009).  
On the contrary, some studies found that effective monitoring mechanisms could be 
introduced by controlling shareholders so the agency conflict will be mitigated (Ang, Cole & Lin, 
2000). Consequently, firms with such agency problems are more likely to hire BIG 4 (previously 
BIG 5) auditors (Fan & Wong, 2005).  
In Thailand, concentration of ownership is an important feature of Thai businesses 
because groups of families operated most of Thai firms, both as private and as public companies 
known as “Thai business groups”. Ownership and control of the family businesses are not 
separated but concentrated within the family groups, and management positions. They are 
traditionally assigned to family members; even if founders retire from a group, most of them 
become honorary advisors (Pananond, 2007; Boonyawat, 2013). This implies that the member of 
families holds management positions and owns the higher the percentage of total shares. As the 
group of businesses created and run by families, this means they must do their best to monitor 
businesses very well and consider the importance of hiring high quality of external auditors to 
help mitigating the agency conflict. As a result, the higher the percentage of total shares held by 
the largest shareholders, the more likely external auditors of BIG 4 audit firms will be chosen. 
 
Hypothesis 2. (H2): Firms with the separation of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Board of 
Directors (BoDs) Chairman are more likely to hire BIG 4 external auditors. 
CEO duality is the situation in which a Chairman of the board of directors and the CEO 
share the same position. The responsibilities of CEO are to develop, lead and execute firms’ 
strategy and business plans including short and long term and ensure that firms maintain high 
standard of internal control system and social responsibility. He leads the management in the 
day-to-day running of business in accordance with business strategies and acts as management 
and the board coordinator. It can be said that CEO is a key person for company to succeed or fail 
from the strategies they create. 
The Chairman is firms’ leadership and governance of BoDs. He is in charge of the 
process of leading board meeting, hiring, firing, evaluating and compensating the CEO. In 
general, the Chairman is non-executive and not involved in routine operations. He is responsible 
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